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This paper assesses the role of ideas in economic change, combining economic and historical analysis
with insights from psychology, sociology and anthropology.  Belief systems shape the system of categories
(“pre-confirmatory bias”) and perceptions (confirmatory bias), and are themselves constrained by
fundamental values.  We illustrate the model using the historical construction of racial categories.
Given the post-Reformation fundamental belief that all men had rights, colonial powers after the 15th
century constructed ideologies that the colonized groups they exploited were naturally inferior, and
gave these beliefs precedence over other aspects of belief systems.  Historical work finds that doctrines
of race came into their own in the colonies that became the US after, not before, slavery; that out of
the “scandal of empire” in India emerged a “race theory that cast Britons and Indians in a relationship
of absolute difference”; and that arguments used by the settlers in Australia to justify their policies
towards the Aborigines entailed in effect the expulsion of the Aborigines from the human race.  Racial
ideology shaped categories and perceptions in ways that we show can give rise to equilibrium fictions.
In our framework, technology, contacts with the outside world, and changes in power and wealth
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Equilibrium Fictions:  A Cognitive Approach to Societal Rigidity 
Karla Hoff and Joseph E. Stiglitz   
 
Psychologists, sociologists,  and anthropologists have emphasized that the 
cognitive frames within which people view the world are both collectively held 
and malleable over time.  Category systems have cultural roots and influence what 
attributes people perceive (surveys are Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence 1999 
and Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan 2005). The cognitive frames operative in a 
culture unconsciously influence, as well, how people interpret whatever informa-
tion they register (see, e.g., Mary Douglas 1987). Yet economists have generally 
neglected the role played by socially constructed cognitive frames. For instance, in 
rational expectations (hereafter, RE), each individual is assumed to use all relevant 
information in an unbiased way.  
However, two economists have called attention to social constructs in ac-
counting for development. Gunnar Myrdal (1968) argued that “irrational beliefs”  
in South Asia bred social inertia. Douglass North (2005), drawing on cognitive 
science, argued that perception is always an interpretation that is shaped by the 
belief systems of the society. Drawing on economic history, he argued that those 
belief systems are a key determinant of economic development. 2 
 
 Recently, economic theorists have investigated the consequences of the en-
dogeneity of cognitive frames (see, e.g.,Roland Bénabou and JeanTirole 2006 and 
Bénabou 2008). They have modeled individuals as trading off the motivational or 
hedonic benefits of suppressing certain kinds of information, against the possible 
biases in action that that may cause. Recent discussions of macro-economics have 
assigned a role to  Keynesian  “animal spirits”—emotions that influence confi-
dence—giving almost unfettered scope to changes in beliefs.                         
In our approach, the infinite set of potentially observable data and the 
infinite ways in which that data could be processed are limited by the finite set of 
socially constructed categories that make up a part of what are called ideologies. 
These categories are a state variable, which cannot be changed in the short run. 
These “lenses” even affect views about whether there is a need for change. Incor-
porating this perspective helps explain why institutional change can be so difficult 
and societies so rigid. A set of beliefs that may have been functional at one time, 
but is no longer so, can persist after the economics/technology that had led to the 
adoption of the beliefs has changed. We explain how even a fiction can be sup-
ported as an equilibrium.  In the equilibrium, individuals’ beliefs affect their 
behavior and perceptions. We show that allowing for “equilibrium bias” in percep-
tions increases the range of beliefs that can be sustained in equilibrium and may 
explain the existence across time periods and across societies of very different 3 
 
ideologies. This approach allows for a larger and more robust set of equilibria than 
can be supported by a RE model. On the other hand, the set of equilibria in our 
approach is much more constrained than the “animal spirits” equilibrium, which 
presumes that virtually any set of beliefs could be sustained. 
While this paper does not provide a fully articulated model of the evolution 
of ideologies, it does present a framework that suggests some key determinants. 
Because belief systems affect the equilibrium, e.g., by shaping perceptions, elites 
have a strong incentive to influence people’s beliefs. In contrast, in a RE equili-
brium, this is not relevant—cognitive frames play no role. But beliefs may also 
constrain the set of equilibria relative to what might emerge if elites could deter-
mine the rules in their own self-interest. The elites cannot simply “choose” the 
cognitive frames that work best for themselves (nor can non-elites simply choose 
the beliefs that might work best for themselves). The task of “choosing” for them-
selves and imposing on others cognitive frames is more complicated and is itself 
constrained by higher-order beliefs. Those in “power” control some beliefs, and 
while they may attempt to do so they typically do not control all the determinants 
of the evolution of beliefs. Cultures are always contested.  
Incorporating beliefs as state variables provides part of a general theory of 
social change that is markedly different from traditional theories, in which only 
capital  and the distribution of power and wealth are state variables.  If beliefs 4 
 
change, the equilibrium can change, with no change in the “fundamentals.”  
We use the example of the construction of racial categories to illustrate the 
idea of an equilibrium social construct (ideology). Section I discusses historical 
instances.  Section II presents a model in which  differentially biased cognition 
helps sustain the idea of race. Section III formalizes the notion of an equilibrium 
social construct.  
 
I. Historical examples of the collective determination of racial categories  
The construction of race to justify slavery. Skin color was not initially an 
organizing principle in the colonies that became the US. There were multiple cate-
gories of coerced labor, and freedom and slavery were not yet associated with 
persons of white and black skin. In the 17
th century,  
“a substantial number of Virginia’s Negroes were free or became free. And 
all of them, whether servant, slave, or free, enjoyed most of the same rights 
and duties as other Virginians. … They could sue and be sued in court. They 
did penance in the parish church for having illegitimate children.” 
(Morgan,1972, p. 18) 
 
Racist codes and beliefs emerged in the late seventeenth century, as the eco-
nomics of slavery  changed. After 1660, Virginia’s death rate, which had been 
“comparable only to that found in Europe during the peak years of a plague,” fell 
sharply.  Two consequences were that  “an investment in slave labor was much 
more profitable than an investment in free labor,”  and  the  engrossment of 5 
 
Virginia’s lands kept many former servants landless and impoverished (Morgan 
pp. 19, 25). In Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676, Virginia’s “Poore Endebted Discon-
tented and Armed” turned against the elite in a plundering expedition that spread 
across the entire state (p. 22). The fear of unrest contributed to the decline in the 
reliance on indentured servants and to the abridgement of the liberties of Africans. 
“To keep as slaves  black men who arrived in that condition was  possible and 
apparently regarded as plain common sense” (p. 25). Some states forbade anyone 
to teach even a free black to read and write. In 1712, South Carolina passed laws 
that became the model for slave codes in the South.  They forbade schooling, 
travelling,  church attendance, land ownership, and inter-marriage.  Yet  given 
emerging Enlightenment ideologies, oppression came to need justification. David 
Brion Davis (1975) argues that at the very point in time when large numbers of 
men and women were beginning to question the moral legitimacy of slavery, the 
idea of race came into its own. Out of this process, the project of creating two 
fictions emerged. The first fiction was the biological inequality of human beings. 
The second was the  natural discontinuity  between the categories, “white” and 
“black.”  Many states went the way of the Virginia statute which, as revised in 
1924, “classified as white only a person ‘who has no trace whatsoever of blood 
other than Caucasian’” (Hollinger 2003, p, 1369). In these ways, race emerged as a 
social construct. 6 
 
The British imperial narrative in India. The East India Company in the 18
th 
century “had become a rogue state:  waging war …and collecting revenue over 
Indian territory” that produced massive private fortunes and contributed to famine in 
Bengal  in 1770  (Nicholas  B.  Dirks, 2006, p.  13, 252).  Parliamentary inquiries 
brought the scandal to national attention.  They culminated in the trial of the gover-
nor of India, Warren Hastings. In his opening speech, Edmund Burke declared, “‘I 
impeach him in the name of the English Constitution, which he has violated and 
broken,--I impeach him in the name of Indian Millions, whom he has sacrificed to 
injustice.’”  Burke protested against Hastings’ “‘Geographical morality’”: “‘We 
think it necessary in justification of ourselves to declare that the laws of morality are 
the same everywhere’” (Dirks, pp. 105, 196,107). But over the nine years of the 
trial, the idea that British law applied to agents of Britain in India was salvaged not 
by finding Hastings guilty (he was acquitted) but instead by inventing a new inter-
pretation of India: “the social, political, cultural, and economic buoyancy of India in 
the 18
th  century was not just forgotten but suppressed.”  “Built on fabrication, 
colonial history imputed barbarism to justify, and even ennoble, imperial ambition.” 
“Scandal became normalized in the assumptions and categories of modernity itself” 
(Dirks, pp. xii,.5, 29). What emerged was a “race theory that cast  Britons and 
Indians in a relationship of absolute difference” (Dirks, 2001, p. 133).  7 
 
 The emergence of a racial idiom for Native Americans. In the mid-17th 
century, it was still common to argue that “‘Nature knowes no difference between 
Europe and Americans in blood, birth, bodies, &c’” (Chaplin 1997, p. 245 citing a 
1656 source). But by the 18th century,  
“[t]he English contended that the Indians were ill-adapted to any region” 
[and] “used that explanation to usurp the very habitat of Americas’ pre-
Columbian natives….  English discourses of nature and the human body 
were fundamental to their imperial project. The proof was in the body.” 
“These beliefs [of Indians’ physical inferiority] were not universal, nor did 
they fail to elicit disagreement…But a good measure of the persuasiveness 
of the argument for English physical superiority was the fact that it appeared 
even in the writings of colonists who were sympathetic to Indians and who 
otherwise argued for native hardiness” (Chaplin, pp. 248, 232-233, 250). 
  
The “expulsion” of Australian Aborigines from the human race. Abori-
gines were classified as British subjects. “The early governors [in the 17th century] 
wanted to see them converted to Christianity and farming …—an idea loathed and 
resisted by every white [settler], no matter what his class” (Robert Hughes, 1987, 
p. 275). One historian characterizes the arguments used by the settlers to justify 
their policies towards the Aborigines as entailing the expulsion of the Aborigines 
from the human race (Humphrey McQueen, 1971, p. 115). Colin M. Tatz (1972, p. 
99) describes over 30 statutes in Australia  that ascribe certain characteristics, 
usually negative, to Aborigines, including the inability to manage their own affairs 
and property and to govern their communities.  8 
 
By the Age of Revolution, oppression both  called for a justification and 
narrowed the basis on which such a justification might rest to one based on the 
slaves’ or the natives’ innate inferiority,
1
   After the 15
th century, racial categories were constructed and given prece-
dence over other aspects of belief systems in which slavery might be viewed as 
 a “presumed incapacity for freedom… 
that crystallized into a racial one with all its subsequent pseudobiological 
trappings” (Barbara Fields, 1982, p. 162). As Montesquieu quipped, “‘It is imposs-
ible for us to suppose that these beings should be men; because if we suppose them 
to be men, one would begin to believe that we ourselves were not Christians’” 
(Davis, p 302). This dilemma did not occur, or at least not to the same extent, in 
earlier periods and in other regions. In antiquity, natural philosophy in general 
stressed “an underlying, universal human similarity” (Chaplin, p. 230) and yet saw 
no  wrong  in enslaving prisoners of war and  colonized peoples. When the 
Athenians landed on the island of Melos, the Melians asked for mercy, invoking 
their goodness in the eyes of the gods. But the Athenians killed all the men, sold 
the women and children as slaves, and colonized the island, justifying their action 
this way: “right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, 
while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” 
(Thucydides c. 431 BC, Book 5.89).  
                                                        
1 As noted by David Hume (1751, p. 45). 9 
 
unacceptable. The categories came to be represented as “God-given.” They were 
entrenched and embedded in individuals’ minds through symbolism and protocol. 
Strictly enforced codes of interracial etiquette reminded the subordinate group of 
its place. For example, in Australia, “the racialized designation of space expressed 
and reproduced social and ontological categories on which colonial society was 
founded” (Gillian Cowlishaw 1999, p. 63, emphasis added).  In the Jim Crow 
South, the unwritten rules that governed day-to-day interactions across race lines 
have been seen “not only as a form of social control but also as a script for the 
performative creation of culture and of ‘race’ itself”(Jennifer Ritterhouse, 2006, p. 
4). As Charles Evers, brother of the murdered civil rights activist Medgar Evers, 
explained in his autobiography, “‘Our mothers began telling us about being black 
from the day we were born’” (cited in Ritterhouse, p.5). Histories in which the 
subordinate group had played a different role, were suppressed (e.g., the Indians in 
pre-colonial  Bengal  or  the  history of  biracial  political  parties  in the US in the 
1880s).  
 
II. A Model of Inequality Based on Fictions 
This section expands on Olivier Compte and Andrew Postlewaite (2004)’s 
model of confidence-enhanced performance and biased perception to show how a 
fiction can be maintained in equilibrium. The model rests on three hypotheses, 10 
 
each supported by empirical evidence. The first is called confirmatory bias: People 
tend to misread evidence as additional support for initial hypo-theses. Experiments 
demonstrate “how providing the same ambiguous information to people who differ 
in their initial beliefs on some topic can move their beliefs farther apart” (see 
Matthew Rabin and Joel L. Shrag 1999 for a review and model). This bias can also 
explain how individuals,  with favorable prior beliefs about themselves, can 
maintain an inflated view of themselves.  
We call the second hypothesis pre-confirmatory bias: When people draw 
inferences, they begin with a specification that posits certain categories, e.g., racial 
categories, that they do not individually choose (Glenn Loury 2002, ch. 2). The 
third hypothesis is that self-confidence boosts performance. For example, in three 
separate experiments, Pamela K. Smith et al. (2008) find that the perception that 
one is low in the social hierarchy lowers performance in complex tasks.  
A recent set of experiments with junior high school boys in India illustrates 
the interaction among these hypotheses. Children in castes that were traditionally 
Untouchable can solve mazes as well as high-caste children (Hoff and Pandey 
2006). Yet when students’ caste identities are publicly revealed, the performance 
of the low caste falls both absolutely and relative to the performance of the high 
caste. We infer that in other possible worlds, the Untouchables could have been an 
equal or dominant group. There are no intrinsic ability differences by caste. It is 11 
 
clear that a social construct has affected behavior.  
In our model, individuals undertake a series of projects, at each of which they 
can fail or succeed. Confidence, based on a person’s perception φ of his empirical 
frequency of past success, affects the probability of success ρ in future attempts, in 
ways that may be beyond his conscious control. Figure 1 shows the relationship ρ = 
ρ(φ). Under the assumptions of RE, there would be a unique equilibrium at the point 
marked RE, where the 45 degree line intersects the curve ρ(φ).  
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium with  rational expectations (at RE) and with biased 
perceptions (at points r and g) 
             
   
However, this will not be an equilibrium if an individual “forgets,”  or 
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Frequencies of success are random variables. But in the long run, a true frequency 
of success ρ will translate into a perceived frequency of success whose distribution 
is concentrated around a single value, which we denote by φ(ρ; γ).   
There are two races, red and green. The critical hypothesis is that reds are less 
able to “forget” experiences of failure: γred < γgreen. The interpretation of this hypo-
thesis is as follows. Pre-confirmatory bias means that racial categories are salient— 
the reds see themselves as red, the greens as green. The reds have historically been 
treated as inferior, and this affects their perception of themselves—how they 
interpret experiences of failure (confirmatory bias). The reds see failures as confirm-
ing their (socially constructed) perceptions of inferiority, while the greens dismiss a 
large fraction of their failures because such failures are not consistent with their 
prior beliefs.  
Equilibrium is the intersection of the production function, ρ(φ), and a percep-
tion function, φ(ρ; γ).  In the equilibrium, beliefs generate a level of performance 
that is consistent with those beliefs, given the bias in perceptions. The result is that a 
social construct will be self-fulfilling. The equilibrium at  point g in the figure 
corresponds to better performance than that at r.  
 13 
 
III. A Model of an Equilibrium Fiction and the Dynamics of Changes in 
Beliefs 
The preceding section modeled a short-run equilibrium,  given a social 
construct,  namely, a racial ideology.  Here we present a simple model in which 
beliefs, however they originate, affect behavior, and we formalize the idea of an 
equilibrium social construct. There are three levels of “cognition” or belief systems 
in the model:    first,  a “lens”  through which individuals process data  (called 
ideology), which we denote by S; using that lens, a set of beliefs about particulars, 
e.g. I am competent, which we denote by Ai for agent i; and third, an überideology 
that affects individuals’ judgments about the adequacy of their ideology (U). Letting 
boldface letters denote vectors (so e.g., A corresponds to the vector (A1,A2, A3,…)), 
the structure at time t is 
        
      At  = F(Qt , St),         Qt = G(Xt , At),     and     Xt = H(At , St) .    
 
The short-run equilibrium modeled in the previous section takes the state variable St 
as fixed. Dropping the subscript t on S, an individual’s particular beliefs at time t (Ai,t) 
are a function of outcomes Qt  and the “lens” S. Outcomes are a function of behaviors 
by each agent (denoted Xi,t) and particular beliefs. And individual behaviors are a 
function of the particular beliefs as mediated through the lens.  For example, in the 
Indian experiments in puzzle-solving, the “behavior” may have been effort. Particular 
beliefs  Ai,t    may affect outcomes in other ways, too:    Low-caste individuals  may 14 
 
generate worse outcomes, e.g., number of puzzles solved, when their caste identities 
are publicly revealed, because of anxiety or other psychological factors.  
The second and third equations can be combined to give  
 
Qt   =   G[H(At, S), At]  =  Z(At ,S).  
 
A short-run equilibrium, e.g., an equilibrium fiction, is defined by a value of A that 
satisfies, for a particular S:                          
 
  Q* = Z(A*, S)    and      A* = F(Q*, S).   
 
This equilibrium departs from rational expectations in just one respect: It posits 
biased perceptions of which an individual is not aware. The bias arises because of 
the ideology. This pair of equations states that, given an S (ideology), people will 
generate outcomes that are consistent with their beliefs.  
There is a dynamic process, which generally occurs at a slow speed:  
 
St+1 = χ (St, Ut, Tt, Vt),  
 
where Ut is the überideology, Tt is the “economic regime” (technology and wealth 
distribution), and Vt is a vector of other variables, e.g., encounters with other civi-
lizations and their belief systems. We will not model in detail the evolution of 




Ideologies  and individual observations of outcomes, themselves  mediated 
through ideology, can provide a set of “conceivable” belief systems, among which 
individuals choose:  Si,t+1 is chosen by individual i at time t + 1 from a set Ω(St, At, 
Ut, Λ(Q,A,S)), where the set is defined (constrained) by the previous ideology and 
beliefs, the überideology, and the perception of outcomes Λ as mediated through 
ideology and beliefs. This is methodological individualism. These “choices,” like 
  Losing a war might lead to a change in views about racial 
superiority. An encounter with a different civilization—people who see the world 
through a different lens—might make individuals aware of the possibility that their 
own lens is distorted. As we noted earlier, there may be pressures for ideologies to 
change when the elites discover that there is another belief system that does a 
better job in maximizing their well-being. The elites may not have sufficient 
control over the processes by which ideologies get formed to do so, though of 
course, they can use rituals and censorship to exert some influence on the ideology 
operative in society. In a democratic society, how that is done may be affected by 
the “median voter” as much as by elites. But there is no reason to believe that 
belief systems evolve as if they were chosen by a critical decision maker. They 
may be part of an (inefficient) Nash equilibrium, one that does not serve well the 
interests of any group.  
                                                        
2 For instance, notions of equality may have been championed by new economic interests to promote free markets, 
but the evolution of these ideas may also have been affected by the evolution of deeper, philosophical or religious 
ideas. The framework we set forth is consistent with these alternative interpretations.   16 
 
other individual decisions, are affected by the social construct. But these individual 
“choices” get aggregated into a new social construct:   
 
St+1 = Φ �(S1,t, S2,t, S3,t,…Si,t, …,Ut, Tt, Vt).  
 
There is a  medium-term  equilibrium  in which there is no tendency for 
society’s belief system to change.  The beliefs that we model here occur at two 
levels: individuals have beliefs about the nature of society, racial differences, etc., 
but those beliefs are turned into social constructs (“belief systems”) through the 
kinds of mechanisms illustrated in Section I, including legislation and rituals. To 
consider this in the context of race, what individuals can conceive of is affected by 
the prevailing ideology. It is difficult in a racist society not to use “racial catego-
ries.” But one can still believe that racial categories should be outlawed and that 
those who are disadvantaged by them would “choose” such a frame. The societal 
frame may change much more slowly. It may pay no attention, for instance, to the 
views of the “reds”—the relevant frames are dictated by laws and systems of infor-
mation-gathering, and those may be controlled by the greens. Alternatively, the vast 
mass of individuals who neither benefit nor lose from racism may “switch” their 
beliefs in a process of contagion—when a racist marries a liberal, their children may 
become liberal. The überideology of equality may make racist categorizations unac-
ceptable to these individuals. That could lead to a system in which there is a sudden 17 
 
tilting of the societal perception when, for instance, those who find a racist 
categorization unacceptable become a majority.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Ideologies (belief systems, including those that determine the admissible cate-
gories, the “lenses” through which the world is perceived) are constrained by 
“higher-order beliefs” that can be thought of as intrinsic values (or an über-
ideology). Beliefs about the acceptability of slavery were affected by the über-
ideology of equality.    Notions of equality made it necessary to invent and 
institutionalize various racial categories to justify certain economic relations. But 
changed notions of equality eventually made the notion of race as a basis of 
slavery—and eventually as an admissible category for other purposes—
unacceptable. 
We don’t explain changes in überideology, just as we don’t explain changes 
in technology. Changes arise partly from internal dynamics—a dialectic of ideas—
and partly from changes in economics and in the opportunities to influence belief 
systems. It is not just economics.  “Motivated beliefs” may help explain change, but 
not in the standard way. The Protestant Reformation emphasized individuals’ rela-
tionship with God,  not mediated by authority;  and the equality of men at least 
arguably evolved out of these religious conceptions. Ideas have their own dynamic. 18 
 
For economists to ignore the factors that affect how we process information as part 
of the interpretation of economic change would be as wrong as to ignore the evolu-
tion of technology itself.  
We agree with the sociologists and anthropologists on the need to incorpo-
rate social constructs  (belief  systems)  into our models of institutions  and 
development. But these scholars have left out that social constructs need to be 
understood as an equilibrium. Ideology is a state variable in our theory of change 
and development (as also in that of Greif and Laitin 2004). The theory we have 
sketched  helps explain societal rigidities.  Beliefs  shape not only behavior but 
perceptions. Beliefs typically do not change overnight. If there were a different set 
of beliefs that might be good for societal elites—or even for society as a whole—
no one (including the government) could manage that change. Untouchability, for 
example, has persisted, at least in some parts of India, despite its abolition. At the 
same time, the approach of this paper provides elements of a theory of societal 
change.  Technology, contacts with the outside world, endogenous changes in 
power and wealth, matter not just directly but because they can lead to changes in 
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